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Atoms and Worms (ontologies of fragments) 
Jamie Brassett 
The nature of any type of existence can only be explained 
by reference to its implication in creative activity. 
Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought, p. 93 
That’s why you should let go of any terror of the new.  




The power of the fragment was of crucial importance to the German 
Romantics especially the Schelgel brothers and their collections (Wheeler, 
1984). This is examined in the first chapter of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s (1988) book on the theory of literature of the period and in 
which they write: 
 
To an even greater extent than the ‘genre’ of theoretical romanticism, 
the fragment is considered its incarnation, the most distinctive mark of 
its originality, or the sign of its radical modernity. [. . .] Indeed, the 
fragment is the romantic genre par excellence. (Lacoue-Labarthe & 
Nancy, 1988, pp. 39–40) 
 
While we could deliberate over fragments that are accidental or involuntary 
and those purposefully crafted like so many ruined follies, there remains an 
intriguing ontological dynamism however they are created. This dynamism will 
be the focus of this chapter; but by way of entry into this, we will return to the 
German Romantics. ‘A fragment, like a small work of art, has to be entirely 
isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a hedgehog,’ 
writes Friedrich Schlegel in number 206 of the Athenaeum Fragments 
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(originally published in 1798). For Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (1988, p. 59), 
fragmentation is the German Romantics’ ‘tendency’ which ‘finally dislocates 
and “unworks” texts’; with the fragment announcing both such an 
incompleteness and completeness (as it designates a Romantic System) at 
the same time (1988, p. 50).  
 Oscillating between different ontological states – remnants of an 
original unity or pieces of a whole work yet to come – these Romantic 
fragments enter into affective ontologies of their own. That is, neither past nor 
future unities adequately contain them and they can develop creative impact 
in a multitude of directions. Take them away from the historical contexts that 
determine how these fragments can be understood (both of the Schlegels’ 
early 1800s and Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s 1980s) and we are at liberty to 
wonder how these little pieces, elements, fragments operate ontologically. 
Such a discussion announces others that relate wholes and parts, or unities 
and multiplicities, homogeneity and heterogeneity, holism and reductionism; 
each of which accesses millennia of philosophical investigation. I have spent 
some time writing about some of these things over recent years (e.g. Brassett, 
2005, 2015; Brassett & O’Reilly, 2018), encountering several philosophers for 
whom these subjects are key (e.g. Deleuze & Guattari, 1984, 1988; Serres, 
1977, 1982, 1995; Simondon, 1989; Souriau, 1989; Stengers, 1997). This 
chapter will not be able to cover everything that these topics require, but it will 
take a look at some of these philosophically to engage with fragments and 
photographic images.1 
                                            
1 There is a characterization of Mandelbrot’s fractals that can align with fragmentary 
ontologies thought this way. As aggregates with fractional dimensions fractals can be both 
more and less than the whole dimensions to which they point (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988, pp. 
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 To do this I will adopt two conceits – understood as both poetic and 
conceptual constructions – in order to locate the ontologies under production.  
These are: atoms and worms. Just as with the Schlegels’ hedgehog, there are 
no single points to these conceits, no single interpretation or set of 
interpretations that they encompass or exhaust.2 In their (1994) What is 
Philosophy? Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write of concepts as the 
creative production of philosophers; products that have important localizations 
in the context of philosophers’ work, but which can be fragmented from their 
original milieus and put to work in other spaces, by other creative 
practitioners. Interpreting the truth of concepts is not the point, they argue; but 
– as Deleuze states in the interview ‘Breaking Things Open, Breaking Words 
Open’ (1995, p. 87) – experimenting with concepts, experiencing them 
differently in the creation of new work highlights the creativity of the 
philosopher. There are no points, only vectors: maybe this is the point of the 
hedgehog? Vectors as points launched out of a single place, breaking a unity 
into fragments that always head outward: atoms and worms writhing, 
ontologically fragmented and multiply creative. 
1. (atoms, worms) 
In Chapter One of his 1841 PhD thesis, ‘The Difference Between the 
Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature’, Karl Marx (1975) writes of 
the atom being negated in the line. There is a sense of future dialectics here. 
                                            
486–488). They play a part in understanding complexity and the way that complexities remain 
at different scales. Thanks to Daniel Rubenstein for noticing this relation. 
2 In an essay on this hedgehog fragment and Schubert, Richard Kramer (1997) leaves till the 
final footnote a discussion of the hedgehog itself, dealing mainly with Romantic notions of 
unfinished poetry in relation to the composer’s Sonata in C Major. The footnote (Kramer, 
1997, p. 148 n. 21), marked against the final word of the essay, opens up consideration of the 
first concept of the title – the hedgehog – just as the paper, supposedly, finishes.  
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It is as if the atoms in free fall become lines only through an act that requires 
their negation. Marx could not have had an inkling of the ways in which 
emergence happens in complex systems where neither the parts nor the 
wholes negate each other (e.g. Stengers, 1997); even while, as Michel Serres 
(1977) notices of Lucretius, atoms swerving provides an early account of 
complexity theory.3 Still, the emergence of lines as smears of atoms falling 
and swerving provides an intriguing image: where atoms are neither the 
reductive creative units of lines, nor the insignificant precursor to a more 
valuable whole. Isabelle Stengers (1997) refuses to accept either the 
reductive or holistic interpretations of emergence, preferring a construction 
where the relation between parts and wholes is both nondetermined by each 
other and in constant dynamic reconstitution. That is, the complex ontologies 
delivered through emergence not only move in ‘zones of indiscernability’ – as 
Deleuze (2003) writes of Francis Bacon’s work – but constitute them too. (We 
will return to Deleuze and Bacon a little later.) Neither atoms (singly or in 
concert) nor worms manage to capture the purpose of their relation in a way 
that controls what the other must be. 
 This is reminiscent of the way writer Kurt Vonnegut’s Tralfamadorians 
(the alien beings that pop up in various places throughout his work) see 
humans. The Trafalmadorians’ experience of time is so different to ours that 
they see humans as a very long worm, with a new born baby shaped end and 
a dead person shaped end. While the worm might smear all the moments 
                                            
3 Louis Kaplan (2009) mentions atoms and Lucretius’s clinamen via the work of Nancy (2000) 
within an evaluation of photographing nakedness. While Kaplan (following Nancy) highlights 
the relational ontology Lucretius’s atomism delivers, such relations (being-in-common) seems 
to accentuate Being. My emphasis here is rather on creative becoming; see also Brassett & 
O’Reilly (2018) on this in relation to design practice. 
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between birth and death, the relation between atomic individuals and the 
emergence of a life (Deleuze, 1991) is not a negating one. That is, at any one 
moment our individuality is not negated by the worm. As a life, the worm’s 
specific locations are able to offer up a particular temporally specific individual 
that may be singled-out at any place. And while these moments do not tell the 
whole story, they are not negated by the process: the process neither totalises 
all moments, nor is reducible to any one, or any single set, of moments. 
Difficult as it is for the non-specialist, we are able to accept that light can be 
either a particle or a wave depending upon our perspective at the point of 
looking and that we are unable to see them both at the same time. Vonnegut’s 
Trafalmadorians have trouble noticing the individual at any moment; we spend 
time constructing ways of imagining that any of our individual moments have 
either duration or identity over time. Nevertheless, the non-dialectical relation 
between atoms and worms (or particles and waves) remains. In whichever 
way we articulate the swerving or smearing of atoms and worms, we are 
layering complex ontologies that characterise a variety of beings and 
becomings both in themselves and in their relations.  
2. (fragmented becomings) 
On the issue of the complex ontologies of being and becoming, Alfred North 
Whitehead (1978, p. 23) writes: ‘how an actual entity becomes constitutes 
what that actual entity is; so that the two descriptions of an actual entity are 
not independent. Its “being” is constituted by its “becoming”. This is the 
“principle of process”’ (original emphases). Becoming is what being does; with 
identity nothing more than an experience generated by the mythological 
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extrapolation of a momentary feeling of stability in a universe of change. 
Where is the photographic image in all of this?  
 Photographs can be considered in terms of such an ontology in a 
number of ways. First, there is the perspective that sees any photographic 
image as a fragment of an event. This is a fairly simple notion and while 
courts appropriate critique – as Vilém Flusser (2000) does in a philosophy of 
photography context – I will examine the relation between a photograph and 
the event a little differently below (§4), with reference to the work of Deleuze 
(1993) and Whitehead. Second, we may view any photograph as an event in 
itself, even while presenting as a fragment of something else. This may be 
how the Schlegels might have approached photography. Yet the tension 
between an individual unity and a fragment of a whole remains: we will 
approach this by proposing a dynamic ontology of individuation with Gilbert 
Simondon.4 
 Individuation, for Simondon, is the becoming individual from a rich 
milieu of pre-individuating stuff. This approach was necessary, Simondon 
argued, because the production of an individual being needed adequate 
theorising, not accepting as an ontological ground upon which an account of 
Being could be built. Though not entirely unproblematic (Stengers, 2002, 
2004; Chabot, 2013), Simondon’s work provides important insights into 
theories of processes of individuation and this conceptualization Deleuze 
found key (Deleuze, 1994, 2004a, 2004b; Voss, 2018). 
                                            
4 Another noteworthy process philosopher (along with Whitehead and Simondon) is Henri 
Bergson. For important recent work investigating all of these philosophers, see: Williams 
(2005, 2009), Shaviro (2009) and Stengers (2011) on Whitehead; Deleuze (1991) and Ansell 
Pearson (2018) on Bergson; De Boever et al. (2012) and Combes (2013) on Simondon. 
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 In one of only a few books on Simondon to be published in English, 
Muriel Combes (2013, p. 28) writes: 
 
From the outset, in effect, the definition given by Simondon of the 
individual as ‘reality of a metastable relation’ [. . .] invalidates an 
approach based upon preconstituted domains; such domains are 
dependent on the modality of individuation, and do not pre-exist it. 
Domains are a result of the manner in which the metastability of the 
individual/milieu system is conserved or, on the contrary, degraded 
after individuation. (Quoting Simondon, 2005, p. 237) 
 
Here Combes highlights Simondon’s approach to individuation. For Simondon 
it is a process that describes how an individual emerges from a 
preindividuated field of potential. As Simondon has interests in information 
theory, technology and thermodynamics, it is with reference to key concepts 
that cut through these disciplines that he characterises important aspects of 
this process of individuation. So, when this preindividuated field is in a 
metastable condition it has the possibility for individuation to emerge and to 
keep emerging; if a field is homeostatic all potential for creative development 
have been exhausted and the processes of individuation stall. Simondon’s 
use of the thermodynamic concept of ‘metastability’ is important, therefore, 
and Simondon expert Anne Sauvagnargues unpacks it as follows: 
 
The concept of metastability intertwines the theory of information and 
the physics of phase shifts in matter, which Simondon gives a 
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metaphysical extension by applying it to every field of individuation; 
metastability thus qualifies the conditions of every actualization. 
Metastable being, in disequilibrium, involves this state of asymmetrical 
disequilibrium which accounts for tension and the production of the 
new. 
 Metastability thus becomes the key concept of a philosophy of 
becoming. (Sauvagnargues, 2012, p. 58)5 
 
Any domain of being is characterised by whether or not its processes of 
individuation have exhausted its potentialities. Our modes of existence and 
the milieus that support, and depend upon, them are as fertile as their 
potentialities allow: metastable, and creativity abounds; homeostatic, and 
stagnation sets in. For Sauvagnargues (2012, p. 58) it is in this way that 
Simondon pushes his metaphysics of metastability to engage culture, 
extending ‘material and vital individuation into the processes of psychic and 
collective individuation’. The processes of becoming that allow individuation to 
emerge from a preindividuated field, therefore, act as much for socio-cultural 
individuation as psycho-physical. 
 In the quotation from Combes cited above, she writes: ‘Domains are a 
result of the manner in which the metastability of the individual/milieu system 
                                            
5 Deleuze, on whose work Sauvagnargues is also expert, says this of metastability: ‘[it can be 
explained as] endowed with a potential energy wherein the differences between series are 
distributed. (Potential energy is the energy of the pure event, whereas forms of actualization 
correspond to the realization of the event.)’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 119). In a footnote in his book 
on Kant, Whitehead and Deleuze. Steven Shaviro (2009, p. 81 n. 7) provides an elegant 
definition of metastability: ‘In chemistry and physics, “metastability” refers to a physical state 
that is stable, but just barely. Even a small disturbance will be enough to destabilize it. For 
instance, a supersaturated solution is metastable’. 
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is conserved or, on the contrary, degraded after individuation’ (Combes, 2013, 
p. 28). In this way Simondon emphasises the immanent relation between 
milieu and individual, rather than take either as the basis for any discussion of 
existence.6 This describes why he also takes being as something that needs 
creating and not the basis for creation. Individuals emerge from a field that 
has potential to individualise, and this emergence either exhausts that 
potential (homeostatises) or not (remains metastable).  
 We have here a particular way of thinking creativity that cuts across 
both Simondon and Whitehead: where creativity actualises potential 
(Whitehead, 1967, p. 179) and does so without diminishing the potential of 
further actualizations (Simondon, 2009). Simondon’s individual is either a 
fluid, dynamic churning of being always in the process of becoming, or the 
hypertelic exhaustion of all possibilities in a self that has no further potential to 
develop. The individual is a process not an identity, properly speaking more 
individuating than individual. He explains, in a passage echoing the quotation 
from Whitehead (1978, p. 23) used at the start of this section: ‘Individuation 
must be understood as the becoming of being, and not as a model of being 
that would exhaust its signification’ (Simondon, 2009, p. 10). 
 This discussion of dynamic ontological development via Simondon 
highlights an important aspect of photographic fragmentation that has been 
put forward so far here. A photograph, to keep its creative potential alive to 
possible future actualization, must not drain this potential in any single 
moment. Unlike the hedgehog of the Schelgel’s fragment, such a 
                                            
6 The influence of one of Simondon’s thesis advisors, Georges Canguilhem (2001), is evident 
here in the relation of living and milieu. Philosopher and illustration expert John O’Reilly 
(2015) brings Canguilhem and Deleuze and Guattari on milieu together with works by Saul 
Steinberg and Chris Ware. 
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photographic fragment should never be complete in itself or isolated from the 
world. A photographic image articulated as a fragment should exist in a 
metastable state such that any becoming into being either re-energises the 
potential from which it individuates, or never quite depletes the pool of 
possibilities in its preindividuating milieu.7  
3. (accidental ontogeneses) 
                                            
7 I have examined similar concepts in relating creative work to complexity theory (Brassett, 
2015) and emergence and entropy (Brassett, 2005). Interestingly, in relation to this discussion 
of Simondon, complexity biologist Stuart Kauffman (1993, p. xvi) remarks that creative 
evolution needs not only emerge from a ‘moderately complex mixture of catalytic polymers’, 
but to carry on needs to create future possibilities for catalysing each other’s potential for 
further catalysis. It is worth noting, too, the relationship between these concepts and that of 
autopoeisis, especially as it is used in the biological and neurophenomenological work of 
Varela (1996) and Maturena and Varela (1980) – thanks to Daniel Rubenstein for highlighting 
this alignment. 
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Image 1. Street Corner, Cincinnati OH, © Author 2017 
<insert Photo 1 about here> 
 
This section has opened with a photo of mine (image 1). To say this 
photograph is ‘mine’ is somewhat misleading, as this picture is a mistake. 
That is, it was taken as I returned my phone to my pocket after doing 
something or other that I cannot remember; the camera app must have been 
running and some confluence of body, software and hardware led to this 
picture (image 1). This photo is not mine in the sense that I took it, but I was 
implicated in its taking somehow. Joanna Żylinska (2017) emphasises the 
network of actors (human and nonhuman) involved in photographic creativity; 
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and in so doing she recognises that the prevalence of photographic 
technology distributed across our bodies and garments and in the fabric of our 
world, requires a new ontological speculation. Żylinska’s work therefore does 
not only highlight nonhuman takers of photographs (drones, CCTV cameras, 
satellites and so on) in her nonhuman remit, but includes other forms in which 
the nonhuman plays an important role in image taking: for example, software 
and hardware, networked systems, apparatuses and machines. In focusing 
upon a wider contextual network for ontological speculation than any one 
photograph plus subject plus object plus framing and so on can manage, 
Żylinska puts across a set of ontological layers for photography that 
announces its increasing complexity. 
 Within this complex array of, sometimes competing, ontological 
positions (tendencies to subject or object, contexts and frames, machinic and 
organic matter, and whatever else there may be), any photographic image is a 
fragment. The ‘whole’ of which it is a ‘part’ is not a larger capturing of an event 
that exceeds it, but an actualization of a network involving many modes of 
being each on its own journey of becoming (Souriau, 2009). To speak of 
‘wholes’ is thus misleading; thought in this way, the edges defining any unity 
are never either fully or permanently inked in and remain, at least, porous. As 
we saw in relation to Simondon, this should help any individuation retain its 
metastability. It is possible, of course, for images to lock themselves down, to 
represent or identify, to become homeostatic, to drain all creative energy from 
their pools of invigorating possibilities. Fragments can become stuck in closed 
systems. Nevertheless, as Żylinska shows, photography’s escape from such 
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ontological desiccation can come from recombining human and nonhuman in 
hitherto unimagined or accidental networks. 
 The work of Bonamy Devas is one of Żylinska’s examples (2017, pp. 
35–37) of human-nonhuman networked creative production, particularly the 
‘Photo Tai Chi’ project (Devas, no date). This project requires the 
photographer to take pictures of moving objects, or while moving the handset, 
while using a phone camera’s panoramic mode; with the result that things 
become interrupted, dislocated, smeared or repeated (see: Image 2). The 
combination of movement and panoramic mode (whether the movement is the 
world around or past the camera, or the camera itself) results in the imaging 
of strange beings. Distorted, cut and pasted in stuttering positions, the images 
in this project unsettle as potentialities for disrupting reality proliferate as if 
intensified, or even revealed, by hallucinogenics. ‘This process,’ Devas 
explains (no date), ‘deliberately subverts the iPhone’s camera software to 
reveal the digital image for what it is: the algorithmic construct of an 
apparatus’. For Żylinska, Devas’s work could provide a ‘revolutionary’ 
intervention in the circuits of those capital accumulators symbolized by Silicon 
Valley (Żylinska, 2017, p. 37). Devas’s picture (Image 2) is one of the subtlest 
of the series. Black headed gulls hover, looking just past the camera; wings 
appear as if from nowhere, headless bodies suspended against the blue sky. 
<insert Image 2 about here> 
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Image 2. Untitled, Bonamy Devas, no date. 
 
The affect here occurs in the misfiring relationship between a camera app’s 
coding and human control and, as the nonhuman becomes a crucial actor in 
the production of an outcome, the power of the image owes much to human-
nonhuman symbiosis and the accidental creative power of them not quite 
working together as planned by the app ad hardware developers.  
 However, there is something closed in the systems of Devas’s 
distortions, for there are still subjects and objects, or controlling intentionalities 
that frame and cut (as Żylinska has it for all photographic ontology), the 
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misfiring of the accidents become somewhat staged, even if the nature of the 
outcomes are uncertain. It would be worth taking a little detour into accidents. 
 Philosopher Cathérine Malabou (2012, p. 59) writes – of experience as 
recounted by Marguerite Duras – ‘here the accident is the experiential 
dimension of ontology’. Malabou’s (2012) essay is a meditation on being and 
becoming, destruction and ageing, and her characterization of the ontology of 
the accident is worth quoting in full: 
 
The possibility of an identity change by destruction, the possibility of an 
annihilating metamorphosis, does not appear as a constant virtuality of 
being, inscribed in it as an eventuality, understood within its biological 
and ontological fate. Destruction remains an accident while really, to 
make a pun that suggests that the accident is a property of the species, 
destruction should be seen as a species of accident, so that the ability 
to transform oneself under the effect of destruction is a possibility, an 
existential structure. (Malabou, 2012, p. 30) 
 
One wonders, then, of the accidental fragment and its ontological status. In 
the sense generated by Malabou here, accident both destroys and underpins 
being itself and so has a part to play in the deviation of being and becoming. 
As if some accidental swerve knocked atoms out of their regular path 
downwards and set them into aleatory patterns of creative generation. Not 
only is accident the experiential dimension of ontology, but the inception of all 
ontology’s creative potential (Lucretius, 2007; Brassett & O’Reilly, 2018). If the 
law of the same precludes any creativity, as Serres writes (2000, p. 21) – ‘If 
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we had only the principle of identity, we would be mute, motionless, passive, 
and the world would have no existence: nothing new under the sun of 
sameness’ – Being must be destroyed to release creative becoming. The 
work of Jinkyun Ahn shown in Foam (2018) expresses similar ontologies.  
 A series of photographs of ‘a mundane afternoon with [his] family [. . .] 
were deleted by mistake and could not be restored’ (Ahn, 2018, p. 11). In the 
three images presented, two – showing the top of a child’s head, framed by 
an adult’s hands and blue-clothed shoulders and chest – are about three-fifths 
‘fragmented into disorderly bits’ (Ahn, 2018, p. 11). This disorder manifests as 
a block containing hundreds of multi-coloured, horizontal striations, which 
mainly emerge as pink. The other image, larger, on the facing page, shows 
what may be the railings of a balcony through a window and a snippet of a 
curved building. Distorted into acidic purple and green, this image is crossed 
in the top third by the same kind of horizontal, block of striations as in the 
other two photographs; though this block seems greyer than the others. This 
destructive intervention has happened after capture, however, the result of an 
aleatory act reworking the source code of sections of the photographs. While 
the original photographs have been taken by Ahn with intention, an outside 
force – we imagine at least electro-magnetic – has crossed the material 
realities of these photographs, rendering them as different kinds of outcome. 
There is something deeply resonant with Malabou’s words here in Ahn’s work. 
Not only has the accident rendered the ontologies of the images differently, it 
has deeply affected the existential, familial, quality of the photographs. The 
outcomes are as if some cosmic force has sought to rub out Ahn’s family; the 
resulting pictures are not affectively neutral. 
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 Image 1 differs from these other accidental photographs in important 
ways. With Devas’s choreographed disturbances, insofar as these are 
recoded intentionally, the subjective and objective possibilities that result 
(Husserl, 1989; Derrida, 1989) remain intact. The senses of creative subject-
as-origin, objectively real image and project framework endure, even as the 
picture space is disrupted and dislocated. With Ahn’s images insofar as these 
deeply disturbed pictures gather some of this impact in relation to the 
existential positions of the taker and taken that persist, disruption 
notwithstanding. Intentionality remains with these images of Ahn’s, even while 
it has been transected by some accidental force, delivering difficult to 
understand work. ‘My’ picture, while being able to have recognizable content 
and identifiable technological modalities, is located rather as event that exists 
with a complete lack of intention. An event the parts of which assemble a 
range of actors that share a diverse participation in an ongoing ontogenesis.  
 The events captured by and as the photographs, but also captured in 
the process of photographing, are not exhausted by that capture. The 
disavowal of well-defined subject and object positions is required for this 
never-ending revitalization of the image to result. These images appear as 
distributions of intensities within the ontological spaces of the images 
themselves, but also in relation to the events that surround their capture: with 
each intensity pointing towards moments of a quickly receding present and to 
others currently burgeoning or yet to come. They are ‘ontological events’ 
(Whitehead 1966, 1967, 1978; Deleuze, 1993) and are in need of 
interrogation. Before doing this, it is worth making mention of Vilém Flusser’s 
(2000) disregard of the event in photographs. Early in his philosophy of 
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photography, Flusser writes (2000, p. 9) that ‘it is wrong to look for “frozen 
events” in images. Rather they replace events by states of things and 
translate them into scenes’. Flusser goes on to explain that ‘technical images’ 
(that is, those produced with the aid of ‘apparatuses’) are characterised 
ontologically by their symbolic representation of complex networks of 
concepts (Flusser, 2000, pp. 14–20). While he quite quickly locks down his 
ontological opening to epistemological application (that is, he writes of the 
‘significance’ of these symbols and the difficulties in ‘decoding’ them), 
Flusser’s account works to remove simplistic discussions of subjects and 
objects of photographs. The issue with events appears to revolve around the 
sense that there is something real which is captured and pinned down in 
taking a photograph; Flusser, therefore, wants to keep within the realms of the 
photograph their ‘magical nature’, those scenarios highlighting ‘states of 
things’ (Flusser, 2000, p. 9) that thread photographs to the world. There is a 
way of thinking events, however, that allows Flusser’s ontological complexity 
to flourish in relation to photography. 
4. (some events) 
When Deleuze devotes a whole chapter on Whitehead in The Fold (1993, pp. 
76–82) he does do as a discussion of the event. ‘Events,’ Deleuze writes 
(1993, p. 76), ‘are produced in a chaos, in a chaotic multiplicity, but only the 
condition that a sort of screen intervenes’ (emphasis added). This screen 
Deleuze (1993, p. 76) characterises not only as ‘a formless elastic membrane’ 
or ‘an electromagnetic field’, but also as a type of filter that sifts ontological 
possibilities from chaotic multiplicity. Deleuze reads Whitehead here as 
providing four components to a definition of the event: first, extension. In 
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terms of this component, an event is that which spreads over all its 
surroundings, in the same way that a notion of whole connects together its 
parts. Second, such extensions of events are distinguishable by their 
intensive qualities; the extensive, connective series establish conjunctions 
along lines of intensity ‘converging toward limits, with the relation among limits 
establishing a conjunction’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 77). Third, an event is 
individual. That is, it is not only extensive and intensive, but a ‘“concrescence” 
of elements’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 78), writes Deleuze using a term coined by 
Whitehead. As these elements of an event coalesce into a particular event 
they become individual: extended and located in time and space, as well as 
positioned in relationship to other events.8 Deleuze (1993, p. 78) explains 
further: ‘the event is inseparably the objectification of one [individual9] and the 
subjectification of another; it is at once public and private, potential and real, 
participating in the becoming of another event and the subject of its own 
becoming’. The fourth, and final, of the components of event that Deleuze 
sees in Whitehead, is ‘eternal Objects’ (the capitalization of ‘objects’ here is 
Deleuze’s).  As events ‘are fluvia’ (Deleuze, 1993, p. 79), as they are 
constantly being altered as pieces add and subtract from their make-up, any 
                                            
8 Deleuze also uses the Whitehead concept ‘prehension’ here, to describe this act of 
individuation. ‘Prehension is individual unity,’ he writes (Deleuze, 1993, p. 78). This is a 
complex concept in Whitehead in which a number of different acts converge – becoming 
subject and object, private and public – and Deleuze has something of a digression into it 
here. I will leave it alone, for now, for brevity’s sake. However, Goffey (2008) provides a very 
good account, not only of Whitehead’s prehension but the use to which it is put by Deleuze. 
Alliez (2008) also provides an account of prehension, in his critical reading of Stengers 
(2008), that is worth a look.  
9 Deleuze really uses ‘prehension’ at this point, but my substitution is made in light of the rest 
of Deleuze’s discussion here, for the reasons noted in the footnote just above. 
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sense of permanence in this flux is given through a relation to eternal 
objects.10 Deleuze explains, beginning with a very Whiteheadian phrase: 
 
Eternal objects produce ingression in the event. Sometimes these can 
be Qualities, such as a color or a sound that qualifies an extension; 
sometimes Figures, like the pyramid, that determine an extension; 
sometimes they are Things, like gold or marble, that cut through a 
matter. [. . .] Inseparable from the process of actualization or realization 
into which they enter, they gain permanence only in the limits of the flux 
that creates them [. . .]. (Deleuze, 1993, pp. 79–80) 
 
Without this ‘ingression’, there would be no event, everything that would be 
extensive, intensive or even individual would simply dissolve back into the 
chaotic flux from which it came. Without such participation in qualities, figures 
or things of permanence, there would be nothing. Deleuze emphasises that 
such eternal objects do not preclude creative production, even at an 
ontological level, but enter into processes of creation at, or even as, the limits 
of the flux itself. There is a sense here in which the interaction between 
events, flux and eternal objects delineate what Deleuze and Guattari (1983, 
1988, 1994) call the ‘plane of immanence’, as none of these (events, flux, 
eternal objects and the processes that cross them) exist outside of the 
empirical in some transcendent realm. The ‘intervention of the screen’ that 
filters events from chaos, which Deleuze notes in this chapter (1993, p. 76), 
                                            
10 Brian Massumi (2011, p. 184), referencing Deleuze (1990), aligns Whitehead’s Eternal 
Objects with Deleuze’s singularities.  
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becomes characterised more clearly now. It is a screen whose fabric is 
constructed by the interleaving aspects of extension, intensity, 
individualization and ingression in the act of sifting. Screens come into being 
when the different elements of the event form in the act of screening that 
describes the becoming of an event; they are evident as the differential fields 
of forces of events coalesce. Various elements of event may be concretised in 
each individual photo, but these do not necessarily exhaust the images. The 
dynamic extensions, distributed intensities, processes and moments of 
individualization and the ingression of various qualities, things or figures 
remain, but the strings of other possible characteristics are not delimited by 
these moments. They may well repeat every day of my commute, as I stand 
and wait; and differentiate as my days differ and the other events to which 
they relate differ. The force fields constantly erupt, even while the events are 
sifted into view. 
5. (intensive fields & figures) 
This positioning of the photographic image as fragmentary even nebulising 
across a range of ontogenetic modes, also alludes to Deleuze’s (2003) work 
on the painter Francis Bacon. In one of his many attacks on representation 
(see also: Deleuze, 1994), Deleuze accentuates the intensive fields 
coalescing or erupting across Bacon’s work. When Deleuze posits the ‘figural’ 
as providing another pictorial mode than the ‘figurative’ in Bacon, he does so 
in order to value an area of intensity within a painting without assigning it 
meaning through either representation or narrative (for example, Deleuze, 
2003, pp. 2–3). Flesh and bones encounter each other through ‘zones of 
indiscernibility’ in Bacon’s work, Deleuze states; zones where neither flesh nor 
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bone, man nor animal, subjects nor objects, attain a definitive ontological 
presentation. Both non-determined and ever dynamic, Bacon’s figural work 
deploys images through which the various and varying figures mark fields of 
intensity that exceed any simplistic and determining representation. Deleuze 
writes (2003, p. 28), as if emphasizing this point: ‘[t]he entire body escapes 
through the screaming mouth’. Then, after reinstating Artaud’s body without 
organs into the frame, Deleuze (2003, p. 44) writes: 
 
Thus the body does not have organs, but thresholds or levels. 
Sensation is not qualitative and qualified, but has only an intensive 
reality, which no longer determines with itself representative elements, 
but allotropic variations. Sensation is vibration.  
 
In escaping the body the figure maps the body without organs (see also: 
Deleuze & Guattari, 1984, 1988): where sensation criss-crosses bodies in/as 
zones of indiscernibility and any organization is achieved only through the 
production of patterns of affective intensity. 
 As such, and especially in relation to his work with Bacon, Deleuze can 
be aligned with other philosophers of excess – Bataille, Blanchot, Klossowski, 
Artaud and, of course, Nietzsche – where overflowing expressive intensities 
play important roles in creative production (for the most part in relation to 
literary work, but drama too11). It may well be that elements within any image 
are recognizable; that is, they can be formed into patterns attachable to actual 
                                            
11 Note here, Félix Guattari’s sci-fi love story screenplay A Love of UIQ (2012). A strange 
eruption of an infradimensional universe into ours, with squatters, political activists, 
schizophrenics and children populating a world that becoming increasingly hybrid. 
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things: people, places, and so on. But it does not have to end here. Objects 
do not remain objects, even if they have been subject to objectification, or the 
concrescence of any event into an actual occasion. If they still hold, or are 
transected by, intensive zones, the possibilities that they have for intensifying 
further affective experience are not exhausted in their capture. A fragment 
need not mark the destruction of a pre-existing unity, neither does it have to 
gesture towards a future whole. A fragment, as the Schlegels write, may be 
ontologically valid in itself even while not, in itself, representing a unity. A 
fragment can be or contain figural zones: those which arrange intensities and 
even as they concretize as recognizable are still open to realign into new 
patterns. The events that transect, and are transected by, any photographic 
fragment, are multiple. The keeping of these multiple possibilities alive is what 
Simondon calls metastability. In many ways such affects can be said to 
proliferate, insofar as the image designates itself as its own set of 
experiences, as well as those that it is capturing (Goffey, 2008). The 
photographic image thus produces new vectors of affect that, while appearing 
to capture a moment, launch into a multitude of new directions.  
 As we saw in relation to Marx’s take on Epicurus’s atom, any single 
image is in fact a momentary concrescence of an event within the smearing of 
a number of fragmented lines of affective intensity, such that these lines 
always spread out from the photograph keeping it in contact with what Flusser 
(2000, p. 9) calls the ‘state of things’. As we saw with Vonnegut’s 
Tralfamadorian perception of human individuals, any image will exist within a 
string of elements – person, landmark, background, and so on – each of 
which is on its own becoming facilitated by other actual occasions 
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(photographer, apparatus, software and so on) each on their own becoming 
too. Vonnegut’s human characters feel affronted by the Tralfamadorian 
disregard of their own feeling of identity. Our certainty of a photograph’s 
ontology delivering well-constituted subjects and objects may show a similar 
lack of imaginative power as Vonnegut’s humans. 
6. (last words?) 
This last section was to be a simple ‘note on the text’, as on completing the 
first draft I noticed something: each section has emerged as a fragment. This 
is a lucky accident. The more psychoanalytical among you may consider 
some unconscious forces at work, generating form at levels below my 
intentionality. However one may, or may not, wish to assign causality, the 
fragments remain. The nature of fragmentation and the direction where we 
may find possible wholeness is not easily pinned down. There are similar 
concepts I have worked with over the years in a range of different articles and 
chapters, with specific thinkers and philosophers recurring: as such, these 
fragments could connect with other writing events of mine and others. To 
make a ‘whole’ (narrative, argument, chapter and so on) is not necessarily 
unidirectional and patterns can emerge from taking strange, sideways steps. 
In this way the ontologies of fragments discussed in this chapter transect 
drives to unify them under well-identifiable, stable or stagnant wholes and 
provide many points of contact with other multiplicities. 
 From Deleuze’s encounter with Whitehead’s event, we have the 
intriguing prospect of intensive atoms and extensive worms, or momentary 
atoms and enduring worms, filtered as both specific occurrences and eternally 
externalising concepts. The lack of fixity of Being should be creatively 
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exciting. If the accidental images shown here can be used to uncover such 
ontogenetic drives, they neither necessarily nor exclusively locate this type of 
creativity. Maybe even the most frozen, homeostatic photographs have atoms 
and worms writhing somewhere in their cracks; and if they do not, we can 
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